The Effects of the Abolition of the Corroboration Requirement in Child Sexual Assault Cases by Lane, Laura
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 36 
Issue 3 Spring 1987 Article 13 
1987 
The Effects of the Abolition of the Corroboration Requirement in 
Child Sexual Assault Cases 
Laura Lane 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Laura Lane, The Effects of the Abolition of the Corroboration Requirement in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 
36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 793 (1987). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss3/13 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
THE EFFECTS OF THE ABOLITION OF THE
CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT IN
CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
The nation's growing awareness of sexual abuse of children has resulted in
an increase in the number of reported cases of abuse throughout the coun-
try.' Child protection agencies nationwide report that an estimated 1.5 mil-
lion alleged child abuse cases were reported in 1983 and approximately
71,961 of these abuse cases involved allegations of child sexual maltreat-
ment.2 The true incidence of child sexual abuse, however, remains difficult
to measure as it is the most under-reported form of abuse.3 Moreover, even
though more cases of child sexual assault are going to court than ever
before,4 it is estimated that approximately 90% of all child abuse cases
across the country are never prosecuted.5
In the District of Columbia, the statistics are equally alarming. In the first
six months of 1986, the Metropolitan Police Department investigated 347
sexual assault cases and 39.7% of these cases involved a child alleging sexual
maltreatment.6 Between 1978 and 1985, Children's Hospital Medical
1. D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM Is A CHILD:
ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 8 (1985) [hereinafter D. WHITCOMB].
2. Id. at 2.
3. NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION,
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES 2 (1981) [hereinafter CHILD SEX-
UAL ABUSE]. The available statistics are sketchy because only recently have states included a
provision for separating child sexual abuse statistics from the aggregate statistics of other
forms of abuse. Id. See D. WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 2, "The Bureau of Justice Statistics
estimates that only one-third of all crimes, and 47 percent of violent crimes, are reported to the
police. Moreover, young victims are only half as likely as the total population to report crimes
to the police." Id.
4. D. WHITCOMB, supra note 1, at 8. This is due to a higher level of reports resulting
from "high levels of media attention and public outrage over sexual crimes against children."
Id.
5. Id. at i. "In many of these cases, the decision not to proceed is based on concerns
about the child's possible performance on the witness stand or the impact of the court process
on the victim's recovery." Id. The reason for the high percentage of cases which are not
prosecuted has gone virtually unexplained. "Both community members and criminal justice
professionals are increasingly concerned about [the] apparent ineffectiveness in dealing ade-
quately with the crime of child sexual abuse." Id.
6. Metropolitan Police Department, Sex Offense Investigation Report 1 (June 30, 1986).
In 1985, there were 789 cases of sexual assault reported in the District of Columbia. Two
hundred and sixty-three of these cases, or 33%, were victims under the age of 16. Metropoli-
tan Police Department, Sex Offense Investigation Report 1 (Dec. 31, 1985).
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Center counseled 2,376 cases involving sexually abused children through its
victim's assistance project.7
Historically, the District of Columbia has imposed the legal requirement
of corroboration on all sex-related crimes.' After the District's case was
presented, the judge could, at the request of the defense, direct a verdict of
acquittal based on lack of corroborative evidence. 9 In 1975, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals abolished this requirement for cases involving
sexually abused adult females.10 In 1985, the District of Columbia City
Council followed the judiciary's lead and abolished the corroboration re-
quirement for child complainants."1
This Note will trace the evolution and the demise of the legal requirement
of corroboration as it was applied in the District of Columbia. An analysis
of the evolution will reveal that the courts have become more flexible in
applying the corroboration requirement in the last decade than in the past.
This Note will conclude that, despite formal abolition, corroboration re-
mains an essential element in the successful prosecution of child sexual abuse
cases because of the nature of the offense. Consequently, the legislative abo-
lition, although meritorious, will probably have few practical benefits.
I. THE EVOLUTION AND ABOLITION OF THE
CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT
In Lyles v. United States, 12 the earliest known reference to the need for
corroboration in District of Columbia sex crime cases, the Court of Appeals
7. D. LLOYD, LEGAL OUTCOME OF CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL NATIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 1/10/78-12/31/85, at 2 (1986).
8. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
9. Lloyd, The Corroboration of Sexual Victimization of Children, in CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE AND THE LAW, A REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 103 (J. Bulkley ed.
1982). "The corroboration requirement in sex crimes is analogous to the government having
the burden of refuting an implied charge of recent fabrication." Fitzgerald v. United States,
443 A.2d 1295, 1305 (D.C. 1982). The District of Columbia statutes that the corroboration
requirement pertained to included: rape, D.C CODE ANN. § 22-2801 (1981); sodomy, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-3502 (1981); assault with intent to rape, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-501 (1981);
indecent acts with a child, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3501 (1981); incest, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
1901 (1981); lewd, indecent, or obscene acts, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1112 (1981).
10. Arnold v. United States, 358 A.2d 335, 344 (D.C. 1976) (en banc). The court noted
that the requirement was to protect the defendant from a conviction based on false charges.
However, the court was "persuaded that the requirement ... presently serves no legitimate
purpose" because the defendant has adequate constitutional safeguards. Id. at 343.
11. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-114 (Supp. V 1986). "For purposes of prosecutions brought
under title 22 of the D.C. Code, independent corroboration of a child victim is not required to
warrant a conviction." Id.
12. 20 App. D.C. 559 (1902). The corroboration requirement did not exist at common
law. 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2061, at 342 (3d ed. 1940).
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for the District of Columbia Circuit13 suggested in dictum that corrobora-
tion was necessary for a conviction if the complainant's testimony was not
credible. 4 The court, however, did not create a legal requirement of corrob-
oration in sex crime cases.' 5 In the next relevant case, Kidwell v. United
States, 16 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed a conviction which was supported solely by the complain-
ant's testimony. ' 7 In reversing the conviction, the court observed that in sex
offense cases where the courts had sustained convictions, "the circumstances
surrounding the parties at the time were such as to point to the probable
guilt of the accused, or, at least, corroborate indirectly the testimony of the
prosecutrix."' Although the cases decided immediately after Kidwell did
not interpret that case as imposing a corroboration requirement,' 9 subse-
quent cases misread Kidwell as holding that corroboration was a legal pre-
requisite to conviction in sex offense cases.2°
13. This case and others cited in this Note were decided prior to the Home Rule Act of
1983, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-201 to 1-295 (1981).
14. 20 App. D.C. at 562. The court stated, "[t]he crime of rape is not always easy to
establish. It most generally depends upon the testimony of a single witness to the actual or
alleged commission of the crime, and unless her testimony is beyond question or doubt, or
made so by surrounding circumstances, there is danger in conviction." Id. (emphasis added).
15. Id. In fact the court indicated that a conviction could be obtained solely on the testi-
mony of the complainant if that testimony was believable beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
16. 38 App. D.C. 566 (1912). The defendant was charged and convicted of carnal knowl-
edge committed against his niece who was under the age of 16. Id. at 568.
17. Id. at 574. The prosecutrix testified that she lived in defendant's home and that he
had been having intercourse with her for three years "whenever an opportunity was afforded."
Id. at 573.
18. Id. This was not the sole reason why the court reversed the conviction. The court
emphasized that the prosecutrix's allegations were not credible in view of her "incorrigible
character" and the "respectable standing" of the defendant. Id.
19. Mears v. United States, 55 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Weaver v. United States, 299 F.
893 (D.C. Cir. 1924). In Weaver the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found the
complainant's testimony "so directly discredited, as to be unworthy of belief." 299 F. at 897.
This passage indicates that the court was applying the requirement that the government pres-
ent sufficient evidence so that a jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court cited a portion of Kidwell which suggests that a conviction for rape can be obtained
without corroboration on the "unassailed testimony of a single witness." Id. (emphasis in
original). In Mears, the defendant's conviction for carnal knowledge of a fifteen year old girl
was sustained. No reference was made to any legal requirement of corroboration. 55 F.2d at
745. See McKenzie v. United States, 126 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (although the conviction
was reversed on other grounds, there was no suggestion of a requirement of corroboration to
establish a prima facie case).
20. Kidwell often has been cited for the proposition that corroboration is a legal require-
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Huff, 442 F.2d 885, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v.
Bryant, 420 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Coltrane v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131,
1134 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dade v.
United States, 407 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Barber v. United States, 392 F.2d 517, 519
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433,437 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395
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Lyles and Kidwell21 were both rape cases involving adult female com-
plainants. In Kelly v. United States, 22 the District of Columbia Circuit ex-
tended the corroboration requirement to sex offenses which were lesser sex
offenses than rape, and in Wilson v. United States, 23 the court explicitly ex-
tended the corroboration requirement to cases in which the complainant was
a child.24 The court of appeals reasoned that cases of sexually abused chil-
dren required corroboration because a child's testimony lacked the reliability
of an adult's. 25 Therefore, the court concluded, if an adult's testimony must
be corroborated, then surely, a child's must be corroborated.26
In Borum v. United States, 27 the court clarified the procedure to be fol-
lowed in sex crime prosecutions. The court stated that "[w]hile the matter
of corroboration is initially for the trial court, like any other question as to
the legal sufficiency of the evidence to warrant submission of the case to the
jury, it is the latter's function to decide whether the standard of corrobora-
tive proof has been met.",2' The court, citing Kidwell, indicated that corrob-
oration was required as to both the corpus delecti and the identification of
the accused, 29 and the jury must be instructed that to convict they must find
U.S. 916 (1969); Miller v. United States, 207 F.2d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Ewing v. United
States, 135 F.2d 633, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S 776 (1943).
21. In Kidwell, although the prosecutrix was under sixteen when the alleged incident oc-
curred, she was past the age of consent when she testified. 38 App. D.C. at 573.
22. 194 F.2d 150, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (Defendant was charged with inviting one to ac-
company him for lewd and immoral purposes contrary to D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1940).
This offense was a misdemeanor, while previously the corroboration requirement was applied
only to felonies.).
23. 271 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (defendant convicted of taking indecent liberties with
an 11 year old girl).
24. Id. at 493. The court noted that the "[a]ppellant was guilty if anyone was, for he
alone was with the child at the time of the alleged offense. But there was no evidence of any
sort, except the testimony of the child herself ...." Id. at 492. "[W]e now hold that the
corpus delecti ...may not be established by the child's uncorroborated testimony on the
witness stand." Id. at 493.
25. Id. at 493. The court relied on M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW 374 (1952). 271 F.2d at 493. "It is well recognized that children are more
highly suggestible than adults. Sexual activity, with the aura of mystery that adults create
about it, confuses and fascinates them. Moreover, they have ... no real understanding of the
serious consequences of the charges they make.... [M]ost courts show an admirable reluc-
tance to accept the unsubstantiated testimony of children in sexual crimes." Id. at 493 (cita-
tion omitted).
26. Id. at 493. The court stated that "[a] woman's uncorroborated tale of a sex offense is
not more reliable than a man's. A young child's is far less reliable." Id. at 492-93.
27. 409 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 916 (1969). The defendant broke
into a home by striking the 80 year old resident over the head with a pistol. Shortly thereafter
a female neighbor came into the house and the defendant forced her to undress and submit to
sexual intercourse. Id. at 435.
28. Id. at 438.
29. Id. at 438. The court found sufficient corroborative evidence in the following: the
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corroboration of each element.3"
As the court expanded the corroboration requirement to encompass more
factual situations,31 it applied the requirement more stringently. In Allison
v. United States,32 the appellant was convicted of intent to gain carnal
knowledge of an eleven year old female.33 Although the complainant's
younger brother witnessed the defendant "on top of" the complainant and
two witnesses testified as to the victim's report and demeanor immediately
after the incident, 34 the court concluded that the story lacked sufficient cor-
roboration and reversed the conviction. 35  The court explained that the
corpus delicti must be corroborated in addition to the identification of the
accused.36 Sufficient corroboration of the corpus delicti entails corrobora-
tion of every element of the offense37 and in this case, the court found that
the element of intent was not sufficiently corroborated.38
The District of Columbia courts, perhaps recognizing that this stringent
standard at times produced unrealistic and unjust results, 39 began to retreat
complainant called the police immediately following the intruder's exit; medical evidence of
intercourse was presented; a laundryman overheard the initial conversation between the com-
plainant and the defendant, and appellant's fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime.
Id. at 438.
30. Id. at 437 n.16.
31. See Wilson v. United States, 271 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Kelly v. United States,
194 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952); see also supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
32. 409 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at 447. The defendant was also charged with taking indecent liberties with a mi-
nor child in violation of § 22-3502(a) but was acquitted. Id.
34. Id. at 448. At trial, testimony revealed that the complainant was walking with her
younger brother and cousin when the defendant coaxed them into his house. Id. at 447. He
then sent the young boys to the store and when he was alone with complainant he threw her
onto the couch, pulled down his zipper, got on top of her, and tried to pull her pants down. Id.
at 447-48. When the boys returned they could hear the complainant screaming and through
the keyhole of the door could see the appellant on top of the complainant. Id. at 448. The
complainant escaped, ran home, and immediately, in a hysterical state, told a friend that
"some man had pulled her in the house." Id. An officer testified that the complainant told
him that the appellant "tried to put his private in her." Id.
35. Id. at 452. The court remanded to the district court to enter judgment of guilty to the
charge of taking indecent liberties with a minor child. Id.
36. Id. at 448. See Borum, 409 F.2d at 437 n.16 (indicating that both the identity of the
accused and the corpus delecti must be corroborated).
37. Allison, 409 F.2d at 449.
38. Id. at 449-50. "Putting aside for a moment the matter of corroboration, we have no
doubt that the Government's case established an intent to commit carnal knowledge." Id. "If
this testimony were corroborated it would surely support a jury finding that, beyond a reason-
able doubt, appellant entertained the intention to carnally know the prosecutrix." Id. at 450.
"Since... the corpus delicti was uncorroborated, appellant's conviction.., cannot stand." Id.
39. See United States v. Gray, 477 F.2d 444, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Terry,
422 F.2d 704, 708 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (criticizing the Allison standard). The strict rule of
corroboration, that every element of the offense must be corroborated, "compel[s] the Govern-
19871
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from this standard.' ° In Gray v. United States,4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, held that the corroboration
requirement had been met and stated that "corroborative evidence [is] suffi-
cient when it would permit the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that the victim's account of the crime was not a fabrication."42 The court
reasoned that the rule should be flexible and the quantum of proof should
depend on the facts of each case.4 3 The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals subsequently adopted this standard and its reasoning in Moore v.
United States." The result was that the strict standard of Allison no longer
controlled while the new standard of Gray and Moore applied to sexual of-
fenses in the District of Columbia.45
Three years after Gray and Moore, in Arnold v. United States,46 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, abolished the require-
ment in cases with a "mature female" prosecutrix.47 Arnold involved two
adult females who alleged that the defendant raped them on separate occa-
ment to prove virtually its entire case twice: once by the victim's testimony and again by
independent evidence." Gray, 477 F.2d at 445.
40. See Gray, 477 F.2d at 445 (corroboration requirement is flexible and quantum of proof
depends on facts of each case); Terry, 422 F.2d at 704 (corroboration is any evidence outside of
the victim's testimony that has probative value); Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295,
1301 (D.C. 1982) (sufficient corroboration need only consist of factual circumstances which
tend to support the victim's testimony); Moore v. United States, 306 A.2d 278 (D.C. 1973)
(sufficient corroboration exists if trier of fact could reasonably believe victim's story); Evans v.
United States, 299 A.2d 136 (D.C. 1973) (circumstantial evidence may be used to corroborate
victim's testimony).
41. 477 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The appellant, who was convicted of rape and bur-
glary, argued that, according to Allison, every element of the offense had to be corroborated.
He urged that penetration, an element of rape, had not been corroborated. Id. at 445.
42. Id.
43. Id. Factors which the court indicated should be considered in determining whether
the standard of corroboration had been met include: the age of the victim; impressionability;
and motivation to falsify or exaggerate. Id.
44. 306 A.2d at 278. The defendant summoned the complainant, a 10 year old female,
into his apartment where he subsequently pulled down her pants. Id. at 279-80. The court of
appeals applied the standard set forth in Gray; that there is sufficient corroboration "if it would
permit the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim's account of the crime
was not a fabrication." Id. at 280 (citing United States v. Gray, 477 F.2d 444, 445 (D.C. Cir.
1973)).
45. Under the new standard, both the identity of the accused and the corpus delicti still
required corroboration. See Gray, 477 F.2d at 445-46. However, there still may be corrobora-
tion under this standard, if, in the totality of the circumstances, one element is uncorroborated
while the others are strongly corroborated.
46. 358 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1976) (en banc).
47. Id. at 344. "[W]e abrogate the requirement in future rape and lesser included sex
related cases, insofar as mature females may be involved .... " Id. The court cautioned that
the issue of credibility of the prosecutrix would still remain important. Id.
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sions.48 In both cases the complainants claimed that the defendant lured
them into his car and then threatened them with bodily harm and death
until they submitted to sexual intercourse.4 9 Medical evidence confirmed
intercourse in both situations but the defendant relied on consent as a de-
fense.5" There was no evidence demonstrating that the women resisted.5,
At trial, the prosecution requested that the jury not be instructed as to a
legal necessity of corroboration.52 The court granted the motion53 and did
not instruct the jury as to the legal necessity of corroboration.5 4 The jury
found the defendant guilty and he appealed."
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted that the trial court, by
disregarding a long line of precedent,5 6 erred in failing to give the instruc-
tion,57 but because sufficient corroboration existed, the error was harmless
and conviction was upheld.58 The court reasoned that the corroboration re-
quirement protected defendants against false accusations, 59 but concluded
that the defendants have the benefit of other adequate procedural safeguards
and, therefore, the corroboration was unnecessary in this case. 60 Despite the
48. Id. at 336-38.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 339.
51. Id. at 340.
52. Id. at 339.
53. Id. The judge commented:
I see no reason under the sun in this day and age.., to say that on the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of a victim a defendant can be convicted of kidnapping while armed,
armed robbery arising out of the same transaction and... where he then commits a
rape he can be convicted of the kidnapping while armed on the uncorroborated testi-
mony of the complainant.., but cannot be convicted of assault with intent to com-
mit rape on her uncorroborated testimony ....
Id.
54. Id. at 340. The judge instructed the jury as follows: "You may consider whether or
not the witness has been corroborated by other independent evidence, or whether the witness
lacks corroboration with respect to any relevant issue .... " Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. "A long line of decisions in this jurisdiction hold that the accused [charged with a
sexual offense] may not be convicted without some evidence... corroborating the testimony of
the victim." Id. "By its refusal to give the instruction on corroboration ... the trial court
defied established precedent .... " Id. at 341.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 342. "Satisfied that appellant had a fair and impartial trial and that the trial
court's refusal to give the required instruction did not affect any substantial right, we conclude
that the error was harmless." Id. (citing Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 344. The court noted that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient for a
conviction." See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100
(1972) (per curiam); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (all discussing proof beyond a reason-
able doubt). The court implied that this standard of proof was adequate to protect the defend-
ant against false accusations. 358 A.2d at 343-44. The court also stated that the requirement
1987]
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broad language, the court only abolished the requirement in cases involving
"mature females."' 61 While Arnold left many questions unanswered, 62 it was
quite clear that its holding would not be applied to cases involving child
victims.
63
In its application of Arnold, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Davis v. United States ' faced the question of which victims would be con-
sidered "mature" for the purpose of determining whether the corroboration
requirement would be applied.65 The prosecutrix was a female who alleged
that the defendant had raped her.66 The trial court concluded that the Ar-
nold exception applied because she was found to be "mature." The jury was
not instructed as to the necessity of corroboration.67 On appeal, the court of
appeals considered whether the trial court had the discretion to decide the
issue of maturity, and if not, whether the victim was "mature" within the
meaning of Arnold. The court of appeals upheld the conviction stating that
the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining that the com-
plainant was mature.68 The court emphasized that age does not determine
maturity and the trial court, which may observe the complainant's de-
meanor, is in the best position to decide the issue.69
serves no legitimate purpose because it probably has little effect on the jurors' minds because
they are normally suspicious of such charges anyway. Also it serves little practical purpose
because the judge has the power to set aside the verdict. Id. at 343 (quoting 7 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 2061, at 354 (3d ed. 1940)). The court also pointed out that the requirement was
not known at common law and recognized that the rule did not stem from constitutional or
statutory provisions. Id.
61. 358 A.2d at 344. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The court concluded,
"[W]e mandate that in the future no instruction directed specifically to the credibility of any
mature female victim of [a sex offense] and the necessity for corroboration of her testimony
shall be required or given in the trial .... " 358 A.2d at 344.
62. The court limited its holding to cases where "mature females may be involved." 358
A.2d at 344. The court never indicated why mature females were any different from other
classes of possible victims. Other dicta indicated that the court was unhappy with this rule in
all cases. The court stated that the rule "serve[d] no legitimate purpose." Id. at 343. See
supra note 61. Finally, the court stated that "we know of no good reason why ... we should
not now purge from our jurisprudence the requirement and all of its demeaning implications."
358 A.2d at 344.
63. See In re L.A.G., 407 A.2d 688 (D.C. 1979); In re J.W.Y., 363 A.2d 674 (D.C. 1976);
Robinson v. United States, 357 A.2d 412 (D.C. 1976). All hold that the Arnold rule did not
apply in cases with child victims.
64. 396 A.2d 979 (D.C. 1979).
65. Id. at 980. The court indicated that the defendant correctly observed that the Arnold
court did not define "maturity." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court observed that age alone is not determinative of maturity. Id. (citing 7
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2061, at 451-53 (1978)).
69. Id. The reviewing court must give the trial court's determination of maturity "consid-
[Vol. 36:793
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Six years after Arnold, Fitzgerald v. United States 70 questioned the corrob-
oration requirement as applied to children. The prosecution charged the
defendant with assault and intent to commit rape. 71 Evidence at trial indi-
cated that the girl entered the defendant's car for a ride to the store. Under
the pretext of visiting a friend, the defendant pulled into an alley, stopped
the car and attempted to rape the complainant.72 She escaped by opening
the car door and slipping out of the car onto the ground.7 3 Defendant then
told her that if she told anyone "he would climb through her window and
kill her.",7' The victim was visibly upset when she returned home but re-
ported the crime to no one until she told a friend the next day.7" The at-
tempted rape was not reported to authorities until eleven days later.76 The
medical examination by this time revealed no evidence of the assault. 77 Con-
sequently, at trial, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal for lack of
corroborative evidence. 78 The court denied the motion because it found suf-
ficient corroboration in "the crying .... the running to her room, and the
other things. . . .7' After determining the legal sufficiency of the corrobo-
ration, the court failed to instruct the jury as to the necessity of corrobora-
tion, thus treating the victim as an adult under Arnold. so The jury convicted
erable latitude" because he has the opportunity to see and hear the victim at trial. Id. at 980-
81.
70. 412 A.2d 1 (1980), reh'g en banc, 443 A.2d 1295 (D.C. 1982).
71. Id. at 1297. Appellant was also charged with taking indecent liberties with a minor in
violation of D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3501(a) (1981) and enticing a minor child contrary to D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-3501(b) (1981). The defendant was acquitted on these two counts. Id. at
1297 n.1.
72. 443 A.2d at 1297-98. Complainant initially entered the defendant's car to accompany
him to the store. He had been a friend of the complainant's step-father and she had known
him since she was young. Id. at 1297.
73. Id. at 1298.
74. Id.
75. Id. "Upon their return to Mrs. Geathers' house, complainant ran into the house cry-
ing. Mrs. Geathers asked what was wrong. Complainant said that her head hurt and ran
upstairs. Further inquiry by Mrs. Geathers was fruitless." Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Defense counsel stated, "You have nothing here other than the statement of the
girl claiming an allegation of oral sodomy. You have a delay in the report... no medical
[evidence], no bruises, no cuts or anything and I submit that this is just insufficient to send to
the jury." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. But see Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1967) cert. denied, 395
U.S. 916 (1969); Arnold v. United States, 358 A.2d 335 (D.C. 1976) (en banc). The court, by
considering the sufficiency of the corroborating evidence, was applying the corroboration re-
quirement, but then under Borum the judge should have instructed the jury as to the necessity
of corroboration for the conviction. Since the jury was not instructed in this manner, it was
actually instructed as if the victim were "mature" under Arnold.
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the defendant."s
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, hold-
ing that the failure of the court to instruct the jury as to corroboration was
reversible error.82 On the issue of the corroboration requirement as applied
to children, the court of appeals stated that a child's testimony was less relia-
ble than that of an adult. s3 It reasoned that since children are more suscepti-
ble to suggestion and curious about sex while not fully cognizant of the
consequences of the charges that they make, proper protection of the defend-
ant requires corroboration in these cases.84
The dissent argued that the reasons the Arnold court gave for abolishing
the requirement as to adult female complainants applied equally to child
victims.8 5 It faulted the majority for concluding that child witnesses are less
reliable than adults s 6 and argued that psychological reports indicated other-
wise.17 It maintained that the rule was discriminatory and should be abol-
ished in all cases.88
In 1985, the District of Columbia City Council passed the Child Abuse
Reform Act of 1984.89 This Act abolished the corroboration requirement
81. 443 A.2d at 1298.
82. Id. at 1303. "We are unable to say here ... that the absence of a corroboration
instruction was not 'so clearly prejudicial to substantive rights as to jeopardize the very fair-
ness and integrity of the trial.' " Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.
1976) (en banc)). But see Arnold, 358 A.2d at 341 (holding that the failure of the court to give
the corroboration instruction was not reversible error).
83. 443 A.2d at 1299. "Courts have traditionally been skeptical of sexual charges by chil-
dren .... " Id.
84. Id. The court relied, as Wilson did, on M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, supra
note 25 and accompanying text.
85. 443 A.2d at 1308. The dissent noted that "this archaic obstacle to prosecution has
been maintained in cases involving children-the victims most in need of protection." Id.
86. Id. The dissent observed, "The majority's justification for distinguishing between 'ma-
ture' females and other complainants lies in its apparent belief that there is a greater danger of
false accusations in sex offense cases involving child victims." Id.
87. Id. The dissent relied on Peters, Children Who Are Victims of Sexual Assault and the
Psychology of Offenders, 30 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 398 (1976), Rosenfeld, Fantasy and Real-
ity in Patients' Report of Incest, 40 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 159, 161 (1979).
88. 443 A.2d at 1308. The dissent noted that "the corroboration requirement in its pres-
ent form only serves to perpetuate discrimination against children of both sexes as well as adult
male victims." Id. at 1308-09.
89. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-114 (Supp. V 1986). Prior to this Act, in 1981, the District of
Columbia City Council passed the District of Columbia Sexual Assault Reform Act of 1981,
Act No. 4-69, which was signed by the Mayor on July 21, 1981 and transmitted to Congress
pursuant to § 602(c)(2) of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Government Reor-
ganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774, 814 (1973). The United States House of
Representatives disapproved the Act on October 1, 1981. If this Act had passed it would have
abolished the corroboration requirement in 1981. See H.R. RES. 208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981), reprinted in 28 D.C. Reg. 4526 (1981).
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prospectively for prosecutions brought under title 22 of the District of Co-
lumbia Code.90 The abolition of the corroboration requirement was in-
tended to eliminate the obstacles hindering prosecution, enabling the city to
try more cases on the merits and bring more sex offenders to justice.9
In Gary v. United States,92 a case that arose after the Child Abuse Reform
Act of 1984 was passed but before its effective date, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals abolished the corroboration requirement.93 The defend-
ant, who was found guilty of raping the sixteen year old complainant, argued
that the trial court committed reversible error under Fitzgerald by not in-
structing the jury on the legal requirement of corroboration.94 In abolishing
the requirement, the court of appeals observed, as discussed in Arnold and
the dissenting opinion of Fitzgerald, that corroboration served no useful pur-
pose because the defendant had adequate protection regardless of who the
victim may have been. 95 The court concluded that there was no valid basis
to distinguish a child's testimony from an adult's.96 It added that children's
reports of sexual attacks had been discounted too long by the courts.97
90. See supra note 11. Note that title 22 of the District of Columbia Code is titled Crimi-
nal Offenses under part IV, Criminal Law and Procedure.
91. See infra note 98.
92. 499 A.2d 815 (D.C. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3279 (1986). The defendants ar-
gued that they were charged under the wrong statutes. They were charged under the code that
existed before the District of Columbia Sexual Assault Reform Act of 1981. See supra note 89.
The defendants claimed that since the one house veto was held to be unconstitutional under
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Reforms under the 1981 act were valid, and conse-
quently, they were charged under the wrong statute. The court disagreed, holding that the
Chadha decision applied prospectively only. Id. at 817-32.
93. The Act was adopted by the District of Columbia City Council on October 23, 1984
and signed by the Mayor on November 8, 1984. 31 D.C. Reg. 5977 (1984). It became law on
May 3, 1985. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-114 (Supp. V 1986).
94. Gary, 499 A.2d at 833.
95. Id.
Since the reasons for this court's holding in Arnold v. United States ... where we
abolished the requirement for corroboration when a mature female is involved, are
equally applicable to all sex offenses, regardless of the sex or age of the victim or
perpetrator, we now abolish the requirement entirely.
The constitutional protections provided the defendant are adequate in a sex case
and the corroboration requirement no longer serves a useful purpose .... The as-
serted purpose of the corroboration requirement was to support and test the credibil-
ity of the complaining witness. There is no reason to distinguish between a mature
female and a mature male sex offense victim. Nor is there any logical reason to raise
barriers to the jury evaluation of the credibility of a minor in a sex offense where we
do not require it in other situations.
Id. (citations omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 833-34.
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II. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF ABOLISHING THE
CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT
Since the legal necessity of corroboration has been abolished, it is possible,
although unlikely, for convictions in sex related offenses to be based upon
the uncorroborated testimony of a single child witness, provided that the
witness' credibility has not been impeached. The legislature and the court's
decision to abolish the antiquated and discriminatory requirement is praise-
worthy because it attempts to remove obstacles to prosecution. However,
while it is true that more child sex abuse cases will now be tried on the
merits,9 8 it is unlikely in practice to have many practical benefits. 99
Although corroboration is no longer a legal necessity, it remains of utmost
importance to the prosecution and yet it is difficult to obtain. Thus, it is
doubtful that the absence of the legal requirement of corroboration will facil-
itate prosecution.
When corroboration was required, the court moved away from the unreal-
istically strict standards of the earlier cases" toward a less rigid totality of
the circumstances test as applied in the later cases of Gray, Moore, Arnold,
and Fitzgerald. 101 Under this test, if the complainant's testimony was credi-
ble and the identity of the perpetrator and most elements of the corpus
delecti were corroborated, the case would withstand defendant's motion for
acquittal and ultimately the case would be sent to the jury. 12 This, how-
ever, was not the only aspect of sex crime cases in which the court became
more tolerant. The court also exercised greater leniency in the area of evi-
dence admissiblity.1 °3 For example, in Arnold the court admitted the testi-
mony of the victims' confidants including a friend, a minister, and an
attorney who each testified about conversations that took place the day fol-
lowing the rape."t0' Perhaps because of the difficulty of obtaining corrobora-
tive evidence in sex crime cases, the court in Arnold admitted evidence which
98. W. Rolark, Report of the D.C. City Council on Bill 5-426 (June 25, 1984) (unpub-
lished report). "With this requirement eliminated, it is expected that more child abuse cases
will be papered, and more cases will be tried on the merits." Id.
99. Arnold v. United States, 358 A.2d 335, 348-49 (D.C. 1976) (en banc) (Mack, J., dis-
senting) (indicating that the abolishment of the requirement without a restructuring of the
penal code would do more to hinder the prosecution).
100. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 45; see also United States v. Gray, 477 F.2d 444, 444-46 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Moore v. United States, 306 A.2d 278 (D.C. 1973).
103. Arnold, 358 A.2d at 348 (Mack, J., dissenting). Generally, this would not have been
admissible under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule because the com-
plainants had time to reflect between the rape and the various conversations. See infra note
106 and accompanying text.
104. Arnold, 358 A.2d at 337-38.
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otherwise may have been inadmissible hearsay.1°5 In child sexual assault
cases, the court has relaxed evidentiary standards such as the spontaneous
declaration exception to the hearsay rule10 6 and the complaint of rape
exception. 107
In the future, without the requirement, the court may tend to restrict its
current view of admissible evidence. In some cases, the complainant's testi-
mony will be the sole evidence that goes to the jury.10 8 Realistically, this
105. 358 A.2d at 348 (Mack, J., dissenting).
106. The spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule allows a declaration made
by a victim to another to be admitted as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter as-
serted. Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1303 (D.C. 1982). See generally Bulkley,
Evidentiary Theories for Admitting a Child's Out-of-Court Statement of Sexual Abuse at Trial
in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 154 (1981). The court has recognized that in the
absence of medical evidence "[t]he purpose of admitting fresh complaint testimony is ... to
meet in advance a charge of recent fabrication [which is implicit in the corroboration require-
ment] ...." Fitzgerald, 443 A.2d at 1303 (citing State v. Tirone, 64 N.J. 222, 227, 314 A.2d
601, 604 (1974)). See supra note 9. The spontaneous declaration must be made within a short
time after the incident while the victim is in an emotional state. It may not be the product of a
calm narrative where the victim has had the chance to reflect and possibly fabricate the whole
story. Fitzgerald, 443 A.2d at 1303-04. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 88 A.2d 582 (D.C. 1952) (4 year
old child's statement to mother admissible since child made statements while under the influ-
ence of recent sexual assault); Snowden v. United States, 2 App. D.C. 89, 94 (1893) (spontane-
ous utterance exception to the hearsay rule extended in cases of child sexual abuse so that a
distraught young victim's statement to her grandmother upon arriving home was admissible).
The District of Columbia courts have generally relaxed this hearsay exception where the
declarant was a child both in cases where the child was too young to testify and where the
child appeared as a witness. Beausoliel v. United States, 107 F.2d 292 (D.C. 1939), expressly
indicated that relaxed standards should be applied to child sexual assault cases. See Wheeler v.
United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1953) (suggesting a relaxed
standard although not expressly indicating the effect of declarant's age). But see Brown v.
United States, 152 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (indicating the dangers inherent in relaxing the
rules).
107. Another evidentiary exception is the complaint of rape. Under this exception evi-
dence that a report of the abuse was made is admissible solely to show that the victim was not
silent. The content of such a report is not admissible. Fitzgerald, 443 A.2d at 1305; 29 Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 297, at 709 (1972); WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1135, at 297-314
(1972). The evidence that the report was made is admissible only if the report was made
promptly or there is an explainable delay in reporting. Fitzgerald, 443 A.2d at 1305. "This
theory is premised on the necessity for admitting the fact of the complaint in sex crimes, be-
cause of the unique requirement that the sex crime be corroborated." Id. at 1303 (emphasis in
original). This is almost always applicable in cases involving child victims because a delay in
reporting may occur as a consequence of a threat or bribe to keep silent. Id. at 1305. See
Testimony of David W. Lloyd on Behalf of the Child Sexual Abuse Assistance Program before
the D.C. City Council, Public Hearing No. 4 on the District of Columbia Basic Criminal Code
Act of 1979 (Feb. 21, 1980). Therefore, in the District of Columbia, "if a child sex complain-
ant tells a parent, friend, a police officer, or almost anyone about the sex incident, that is some
evidence of corroboration as a matter of law ...." Fitzgerald, 443 A.2d at 1303 n.12.
108. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 3, at 16. If the child's testimony is the sole evi-
dence to go to the jury, the defendant will also be less likely to plead guilty. Id.
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implies that the defense must work harder to place the complainant's testi-
mony in doubt. As a result, the complainant will be subjected to closer scru-
tiny during the investigatory stages and perhaps a more rigorous cross-
examination. 0
Clearly, the absence of the requirement confers an immediate benefit upon
prosecutors by alleviating their concern over the possibility that the court
will direct a verdict and acquit the defendant due to lack of corroborative
evidence.11o However, the prosecutor must still concern himself with ob-
taining enough corroborative evidence to avoid the judge setting aside the
verdict or having the conviction reversed on appeal due to the insufficiency
of the evidence. 11 In addition, the prosecutor must obtain sufficient evi-
dence to overcome the jury's suspicion of the child's testimony. 112
With a legal corroboration requirement absent, the issue of whether the
evidence corroborates the child's testimony is totally within the province of
the jury. Juries are suspicious of allegations that are sex related" 3 and addi-
tionally may believe certain prevalent myths about children such as their
suggestibility, curiosity, and tendency to fantasize about sex. 1 4 These as-
sumptions, which may automatically place the child's credibility in doubt,
are erroneous. Psychological studies demonstrate that children only
fantasize about circumstances within their experience and observation.
115
Although children are likely to be curious, they are unlikely to make false
reports about sex." 6 Finally, studies show that children are no more sug-
109. Arnold, 358 A.2d at 348 (Mack, J., dissenting) (indicating that the abolishment of the
corroboration requirement without further reform will make the trial more difficult on the
victim).
110. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
11. Lloyd, supra note 9, at 103.
112. Id. Jurors' preconceived beliefs about children may have a powerful impact on their
evaluation of the child's credibility. J. BULKLEY, RECOMMENDATIONS OF IMPROVING LEGAL
INTERVENTION FOR INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 33 (1982); D. Shackleton,
Chairperson, Comm. on Human Services, Committee Comments on Bill 5-425 (June 29,
1984); Goodman, Golding & Haith, Jurors' Reactions to Child Witnesses, 40 J. SOCIAL ISSUES
139, 141 (1984) [hereinafter Goodman].
113. Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Regarding Necessityfor Corroboration of Victim's
Testimomy in Prosecution for Sexual Offense, 31 A.L.R. 4th 120 (1986). There are three false
presumptions concerning sex crime cases in general: (1) a great number of cases are false
reports; (2) the jury is prejudiced against the defendant; and (3) rape is an accusation which is
difficult to defend against. J. BULKLEY, supra note 112, at 31; L. HOLMSTROM & A. BURGESS,
THE VICTIM OF RAPE 238 (1978); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 70-71
(1966); S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM 213-14 (1979); D.
LLOYD, supra note 9, at 103-04.
114. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 112.
116. See supra note 112.
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gestible than adults."' 7 Therefore, jurors should not be any more skeptical
about a child's testimony than that of an adult. Studies show, however, that
jurors are more skeptical.' 18
These fallacies, which may place the child's credibility in doubt, may be
reinforced in the minds of the jurors if the judge gives a discretionary in-
struction which states in relevant part: "Children are likely to be more sug-
gestible than adults. Moreover, children may not have a full understanding
of the serious consequences of [the testimony they give] [the charges they
make] . . . 19 This cautionary instruction, which is based on fallacious
assumptions,120 underscores the importance of corroboration from the
prosecutorial standpoint.
Unfortunately, corroboration is an element found lacking in many of these
cases. Due to the nature of the crime, there are rarely any eyewitnesses. 12 1
Medical evidence is also found lacking as well because in many cases the
sexual contact falls short of penetration. 122 Also, in 80% of the sex related
crimes committed against children in the District of Columbia, there is no
medical evidence of resistance because the child victim is generally not forci-
bly raped but rather is threatened or bribed.' 2 3 Finally, many times a child
does not show signs of emotional distress immediately following the assault
but instead the child's behavior may change in subtle and often misunder-
stood ways.' 24
III. CONCLUSION
The legislature and courts admirably have abolished the corroboration re-
117. See supra note 112.
118. Goodman, supra note 112, at 143-44. "In sum, jurors are likely to enter the court-
room with biases against children's credibility, but these biases can be overcome by sufficient
evidence. If the evidence is ambiguous, jurors' attitudes about children's credibility may be
one important influence on the final verdict." Id.; see J. BULKLEY, supra note 112, at 33; Note,
The Rape Corroboration Requirement.- Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1382-83 (1972)
(suggesting that even absent the corroboration requirement, prosecutors rarely pursue a case
relying solely on complainant's testimony).
119. H. GREEN & T. GUIDOBONI, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA (3d ed. 1978), instruction 2.21.
120. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
121. Lloyd, supra note 9, at 107. If there is eyewitness testimony in these cases corrobora-
tion is rarely an issue anyway because the defendant will normally plea bargain. Id.
122. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, supra note 3, at 16.
123. Id. Testimony of David W. Lloyd on Behalf of the Child Sexual Abuse Assistance
Program before the D.C. City Council, Public Hearing No. 4 on the District of Columbia
Basic Criminal Code Act of 1979 (Feb. 21, 1980). Also, in cases of intra-family sexual abuse
cases, reports are made long after abuse has occurred and, therefore, physical evidence may be
nonexistent. Id.
124. Id. at 4, reprinted in Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1308 (D.C. 1982).
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quirement and, in doing so, have dismissed a discriminatory and antiquated
rule based on faulty assumptions about the nature of sex related cases and
complainants. While this may be one step toward bringing sex offenders to
justice, it is doubtful that this step will bring about many practical benefits.
Corroboration with the rule in place or in its absence is still essential to
prosecution and is a severe detriment where it is lacking.
Laura Lane
